#isTemplateObject ?

result = sensitiveOperation`trusted0 ${ untrusted } trusted1`
// Authored by dev          ^^^^^^^^                ^^^^^^^^
// May come from outside                ^^^^^^^^^

function (trustedStrings, ...untrustedArguments) {
  if (Reflect.isTemplateObject(trustedStrings)
      // instanceof provides a same-Realm guarantee for early frozen objects.
      && trustedStrings instanceof Array) {
    // Proceed knowing that trustedStrings come from
    // the JavaScript module's authors.
  } else {
    // Do not trust trustedStrings
  }
}

const attackerControlledString = '((x) => x)`evil string`';

// 天真代码
let x = eval(attackerControlledString)

console.log(Reflect.isTemplateObject(x));

const { Array, Reflect, TypeError } = globalThis;
const { createPolicy } = trustedTypes;
const { isTemplateObject } = Reflect;
const { error: consoleErr } = console;

/**
 * A tag function that produces *TrustedHTML* or null if the
 * policy name "trustedHTMLTagFunction" is not available.
 */
export trustedHTML = (() => {
  // We use TrustedType's first-come-first-serve policy name restrictions
  // to provision this scope with sensitiveOperation.
  const policyName = 'trustedHTMLTagFunction';
  let policy;
  try {
    policy = createPolicy(
        'trustedHTMLTagFunction',
        { createHTML(s) { return s } }
    );
  } catch (ex) {
    consoleErr(`${policyName} is not an allowed trustedTypes policy name`);
    return null;
  }

  // This is the sensitive operation.
  const { createHTML } = policy;

  // This tag function uses isTemplateObject to reject strings that
  // do not appear in user code in the same realm.
  //
  // With a reliable isTemplateObject check, the attack surface is
  // <= |set of template applications in trusted code|.
  //
  // That set is finite.
  //
  // Without a reliable isTemplateObject check, the attack surface is
  // <= |set of attacker controlled strings|.  That is, in practice,
  // unbounded.
  //
  // This assumes no attacker has eval.
  const trustedHTMLTagFunction = (strings) => {
    if (isTemplateObject(strings) && strings instanceof Array) {
      return createHTML(strings.raw[0]);
    }
    throw new TypeError("Expected template object");
  };

  // With the check it's safe to export this tag function that closes
  // over a sensitive operation to anyone.
  return trustedHTMLTagFunction;
})()

// A naive, but non-malicious function.
function f(x) {
  // People trust trustedHTMLTagFunction.
  // Our HTML is trustworthy because <bad argument> so we'll just
  // piggyback off that by using a value that looks like a template object.
  // What could possibly go wrong?
  const s = dodgyMarkdownToHTMLConverter(x);
  const pseudoTemplateObject = [s];
  pseudoTemplateObject.raw = Object.freeze([s]);
  return trustedHTML(Object.freeze(pseudoTemplateObject));
}

// An attacker controlled string reaches f().
const payload = '<img onerror=alert(document.origin) src=x>';
console.log(`f(${ JSON.stringify(payload) }) = ${ f(payload) }`);